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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the empirical evidence of increasing the chances of financial crises induced
by opening up developing countries to short-term capital inflows, and appraises the various proposals
made for mitigating the severity of financial crises.  We point out that there is solid evidence that financial
opening increases the chance of financial crises.  There is more tenuous evidence that financial opening
contributes positively to long-run growth.  Hence, there may be a complex trade off between the adverse
intermediate run and the beneficial long run effects of financial opening.  The literature is abounded with
proposals aimed at improving this intertemporal trade-off, reducing the costs of financial crises.  A
version of the Lucas critic may limit the welfare gain of these proposals.  Hence, a better understanding
of the structural characteristics leading to exposure and crises is the key for designing a successful
restructuring of the global capital market.  Some of the reforms may fall short of success due to
coordination failure: they may be effective only if they were adopted comprehensively by all the relevant
financial centers.  Finally, some of the proposals may be too optimistic, ignoring the time inconsistency
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This paper has two goals.  First, it evaluates the empirical evidence of increasing 
the chances of financial crises induced by opening up developing countries to short-term 
capital inflows.   Second, it appraises the various proposals made for mitigating the 
severity of financial crises.  We argue that there is solid evidence that financial opening 
increases the chance of financial crises.  There is more tenuous evidence that financial 
opening contributes positively to long-run growth.  Hence, there may be a complex trade-
off between the adverse intermediate run and the beneficial long run effects of financial 
opening.  These findings impose a challenge to policy makers – how to supplement 
financial opening with policies that would improve this intertemporal trade-off.  The 
literature is abounded with proposals aimed at reducing the costs of financial crises.  Yet, 
there has been limited progress in designing credible reforms to deal with these 
challenges.   
To put this issue in a broader context, the debate about financial opening is a 
reincarnation of the earlier immiserizing growth literature, identifying conditions under 
which growth may be welfare reducing in the presence of preexisting distortions.
1  While 
financial opening opts to increase welfare when the only distortion is restricting 
intertemporal trade across countries, financial opening may be welfare reducing in the 
presence of other distortions.  An important example of such a distortion is moral hazard, 
which frequently acts as an implicit subsidy to borrowing and investment.
2  In financial 
autarky, the pool of domestic savings confines the cost of the moral hazard distortion.  
Financial opening implies that the scale of investment will be determined by the access to 
global saving.  If in autarky the domestic real interest rate exceeded the global one, the 
resultant inflow of capital would magnify the existing distortion, thereby reducing 
welfare.  This situation is illustrated in Figure 1, where S depicts domestic saving, and I is 
the domestic investment in the absence of moral hazard.  Moral hazard would shift the 
effective investment to I’.  In these circumstances, the welfare cost of moral hazard is 
given by the black triangle in panel a (where the benchmark for evaluating welfare in 
panel a is financial autarky in the absence of moral hazard).  If the global interest rate is 
                                                 
1 See, Bhagwati (1956), Johnson (1967) and Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977). 
2 See McKinnon and Pill (1996), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Dooley (2000); 
and Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000).     3
r*, financial opening in the presence of moral hazard reduces welfare by the shaded 
triangle (where the benchmark for evaluating welfare in panel b is the welfare with open 
financial markets, in the absence of moral hazard).  If the supply of domestic saving is 
relatively inelastic, whereas the demand for investment is relatively elastic, financial 
opening will tend to reduce welfare. A similar argument applies to other distortions.   
The more recent literature dealing with welfare effects of financial opening added 
to the earlier studies by modeling the process of financial intermediation.  A key 
difference between the earlier literature and the one dealing with financial intermediation 
is the switch in focus, from the commercial to the financial aspects of opening up.  This 
matters, as the adjustment of financial markets to news and policies is much faster than 
that of commercial flows of goods and services.  A by-product of this switch is the focus 
of the new literature on conditions leading to the instantaneous reversal in the flow of 
financial assets, generating financial crises. 
This recent literature has lead to a spirited debate concerning the wisdom of 
unrestricted capital mobility between the OECD and emerging markets.   Various studies 
have identified circumstances in which unlimited capital mobility may be sub-optimal 
(see Table A for a summary of some of these studies).  Not withstanding the above 
debate, the strongest argument for financial opening is the pragmatic one. Like it or not, 
greater trade integration erodes the effectiveness of restrictions on capital mobility.  
Hence, for successful emerging markets that engage in trade integration, financial 
opening is not a question of if, but of when and how.  Consequently, the pragmatic 
approach to the problem should recognize that there is no quick fix to the exposure to 
financial crises induced by financial opening. Instead, the challenge is to reduce the depth 
and the frequency of the crises.  The core of the problem is that we deal with incomplete 
financial markets, exposing the creditors to sovereign risk and moral hazard.
3  As there 
are fundamental reasons for the incompletion of these markets, one doubts whether there  
                                                 
3 See for a review of the literature on sovereign risk see Eaton and Fernandez (1995).   4
  
 
exists a smart fix that will prevent future crises.  Instead, the hope is that new policies and 
improved coordination will reduce the severity of financial crises, thereby improving the 
odds of a positive long-run welfare effect of financial opening.   
 
Section 1 starts with the review of the empirical evidence.  Section 2 reviews the 
various proposals attempting to reform the global financial system.  Section 3 provides an 
appraisal of the various proposals made for preventing financial crises.   Specifically, it 
argues that a version of the Lucas critic may limit the welfare gain of these proposals.  Of 
course, this is not an argument against adopting reforms.  It suggests, however, that a 
better understanding of the structural characteristics leading to exposure and crises is the 
key for designing a successful restructuring of the capital market.  A reform that would 
not deal with these structural factors runs the risk of leading to disappointing welfare 
gains at best, and to crises in the worst case.  Some of the reforms may fall short of 
success due to coordination failure: they may be effective only if they would be adopted 
comprehensively by all the relevant financial centers.  Finally, some of the proposals may 
be too optimistic, ignoring the time inconsistency and political economy considerations 
that would challenge the practicality of the best-intended reforms, as well as in presuming 
the ability to verify unambiguously the quality of macroeconomic adjustment.   
 
1.  Financial opening and financial crises: the evidence 
   The recent research has two common themes: it validated empirically the 
assertion ‘Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash.’ (Diaz-Alejandro 
(1985)).  Yet, it also found tenuous evidence that financial liberalization tends to increase 
growth overtime.  Both observations suggest an intertemporal trade-off.  In the short-run, 
the fragility induced by financial opening leads frequently to crises.   Yet, if these crises 
would force the country to deal with its structural deficiencies, financial opening may 
induce a higher growth rate in the long-run.  The empirical literature relies frequently on 
cross-country methodology.  Thus, it provides us with little guidance in evaluating the net 
welfare effects of financial opening.  For example, it remains hard to gauge if Korea 
would have been better off by refraining from financial opening in the early nineties, or if   5
Chile would have benefited by retaining financial repression in the eighties-nineties.
4  
The answers to these questions depend crucially on the time horizon of the analysis, as 
well as on the evaluation of what is the relevant counterfactual, both issues to which there 
are no satisfactory answers.
5   
  We illustrate the empirical literature by reviewing selectively several examples.  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that problems in the banking sector typically 
precede a currency crisis, and that a currency crisis deepens the banking crisis, activating 
a vicious spiral.  Importantly, they also found that financial liberalization often precedes 
banking crises. Similar results were replicated in several papers using different 
methodologies.  Glick and Hutchison (1999) investigated a sample of 90 countries during 
1975-1997, covering 90 banking crises, 202 currency crises, and 37 twin crises.  They 
found that banking and twin crises have occurred mainly in developing countries, and 
their number increased in the 1990s.  Twin crises are mainly concentrated in financially 
liberalized emerging-market economies.  These findings support the conjecture that 
openness of emerging markets to international capital flows, combined with a liberalized 
financial structure, makes them particularly vulnerable to twin crises. The costs of these 
crises are substantial.  Currency crisis, on average, leads to a cost of 8% pre crisis GDP.  
                                                 
4 Obviously, the financial crisis in 1997 impacted Korea’s welfare adversely.  One may 
argue, however, that it prevented a much deeper and longer calamity, akin to Japan’s 
recession in the last ten years.  Arguably, had Korea continued with financial repression, 
a Japanese type of a correction would have hit Korea later.  Korea’s development path 
resembles that of Japan -- its domestic banks accumulated overtime large non-performing 
loans.  These loans were the heritage of the earlier development strategy, where large 
corporations had selective access to preferential lines of credit.  According to this 
argument, the crisis of 1997 prevented a larger buildup of these loans, saving Korea from 
a much deeper correction.  Obviously, it is hard to provide a sound test of this argument.  
See Haggard (2000) for further discussion on the interaction between the public and the 
private sector in Korea and other countries in the Far East.  Similar ambiguities apply to 
Chile, which has been the best performing Latin American country in recent years, and is 
credited with a sound banking system.  Yet, Chile experienced a massive banking crisis 
in the eighties, following earlier financial opening.  Arguably, one may credit the superior 
recent performance of Chile to the painful earlier reforms, reforms that were triggered by 
the crises of the early eighties.   
5 A welfare evaluation of these issues may depend on the degree to which there are 
political economy trade-offs between a large crisis versus a series of smaller crises – a 
large crisis may be needed to overcome entranced opposing interest groups, yet it may 
lead to larger welfare costs.     6
Simultaneous currency and banking crises reduce the pre crisis GDP by 18% (World 
Bank (1998), and Caprio G. and P. Honohan (1999)).  
  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) studied the empirical relationship 
between banking crises and financial liberalization in 53 countries during 1980-95. They 
found that Banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial systems. The 
impact of financial liberalization on the fragility of banks is weaker, however, when the 
institutional environment is strong (Relevant institutional characteristics - respect for the 
rule of law, a low level of corruption, and good contract enforcement).  They found that 
banks’ franchise values decline after financial liberalization.  Hence, the intensification of 
the moral hazard associated with lower franchise values may be one of the sources of 
increased banking sector fragility.  Financial liberalization is followed by improved 
financial development, while banking crises tend to slow it down.  In countries that 
liberalize from a position of financial repression, financial development improves even if 
a banking crisis takes place.  Their results support the view that financial liberalization 
should be approached cautiously where the institutions necessary to ensure law and 
contract enforcement, effective prudential regulation and supervision are not fully 
developed, even if macroeconomic stabilization has been achieved.   
  A useful survey of Financial Liberalization is Williamson and Mahar (1998), who 
focused on 34 countries that undertook financial liberalization between 1973-1996.  
Overall, they found a mixed record of financial liberalization -- The gains are there, but 
the liberalization carries the risk of leading to financial crisis.  Financial liberalization has 
yielded greater financial depth, and increased efficiency in the allocation of investment.  
Yet, it has not brought the boost in saving.  The drawbacks in the liberalization process 
are the danger that the liberalization will lead to a financial crisis.  For the majority of 
countries, capital account liberalization increases its probability.  The challenge is to 
design a liberalization program that does not bring a financial crisis in its wake.  The 
main recommendations emerging from their study are akin to Hellman, Murdock and 
Stiglitz (2000) -- start with macroeconomic stabilization, improve bank supervision, 
while delaying capital-account convertibility to the end of the process.  In the transition, 
"mild financial repression," in the form of a ceiling on deposit interest rate, may be 
advantageous.  This follows from the observation that exceedingly high interest rates   7
encourage risk taking by borrowers – moral hazard induced by self-selection.  Banks in 
stress may wish to ‘gamble for resurrection’ by lending to such borrowers, at a cost to the 
taxpayer.  Williamson and Mahar conclude that maintaining high spreads may be needed 
in a transition until banks are able to work off the legacy of bad debt inherited from the 
period of financial repression.  In such an environment, free entry of foreign banks may 
be a mixed blessing.  The efficiency gains should be balanced against the threat of 
'gamble for resurrection' by older domestic banks losing their franchise value. Imposing 
higher capital requirements increases the cost of a 'gamble for resurrection' strategy.  In 
these circumstances, deposit rate controls may complement capital requirements.  
The overall effect of financial opening on growth remains debatable.  Levine 
(1997) found a positive association, whereas Rodrik (1998) failed to depict any positive 
effects of financial opening on investment, growth and inflation.  While Levine’s 
interpretation attaches the direction of causality from financial deepening to growth, the 
old dictum that correlations do not indicate causality remains valid.   More recently, 
Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) evaluated the empirical links between the level of 
financial intermediary development and economic growth, TFP growth, physical capital 
accumulation, and private savings rates.  The main findings are that financial 
intermediaries exert a large, positive impact on total factor productivity growth, which 
feeds through to overall GDP growth.  Yet, the long-run links between financial 
intermediary development and both physical capital growth and private savings rates are 
tenuous.  Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) found that equity market liberalizations, 
on average, lead to a one percent increase in annual real economic growth over a five-
year period. The investment/GDP ratio increases post liberalization, with the investment 
partially financed by foreign capital inducing worsened trade balances. The liberalization 
effect is enhanced by a large secondary school enrollment, a small government sector and 
an Anglo-Saxon legal system.
6  
Rodrik’s earlier methodology has been revisited by Arteta, Eichengreen, and 
Wyplosz (2001). While they found indications of a positive association between capital 
                                                 
6 As is frequently the case with empirical studies relying on Macro date, endogeneity and 
reverse causality remain a valid concern in interpreting some of these results.   
   8
account liberalization and growth, the effects vary with time, with how capital account 
liberalization is measured, and with how the relationship is estimated.  The evidence that 
the effects of capital account liberalization are stronger in high-income countries is 
fragile. There is some evidence that the positive growth effects of liberalization are 
stronger in countries with strong institutions.  Capital account liberalization appears to 
have positive effects on growth only in countries that have already opened more 
generally, hence sequencing matters. But there are significant prerequisites for opening, 
including a reduction of trade barriers and an ability to eliminate macroeconomic 
imbalances.  These conclusions are akin to Edwards (2001) who reported that, after 
controlling for other variables (including aggregate investment), countries with a more 
open capital account have outperformed countries that have restricted capital mobility. 
There is also evidence that an open capital account affects growth positively only after a 
country has achieved a certain degree of economic development. This provides support to 
the view that there is an optimal sequencing for capital account liberalization. 
 
 
2.  Proposals for preventing financial crises induced by financial opening 
 This section provides a brief summary of the various proposals.
7  These reforms 
can be classified along several dimensions.  First, proposals differ in the weight given to 
reforming the incentives facing creditors, debtors, or the interaction between the two 
groups.  Second, proposals differ in the weight given to ex-ante risk reduction, versus ex-
post orderly management and resolution of actual crises.  Third, proposals differ in the 
depth of the reform.  Some deal with upgrading regulations within the existing 
institutional environment, whereas others suggest bolder steps, envisioning the creation 
of new institutions.  Table B summarizes the main proposals.   
One line of reform focuses on the possibility that, by subsidizing sovereign 
borrowing, the involvement of institutions may exacerbate the problem, inducing moral 
hazard.  For example, the belief that the IMF, World Bank and banking deposit 
insurances schemes will bailout creditors generates over borrowing, ending with more 
                                                 
7 Several recent monographs overviewed comprehensively the various proposals.  See 
Eichengreen (1999), Rogoff (1999), Frankel and Roubini (2001), and Feldstein (2002).   9
frequent and deeper crises, at the taxpayers’ expense.  A profound reform of the IMF, as 
suggested by the Meltzer committee (1998), would restrict IMF’s role to helping 
countries meeting ex-ante conditionality [see also Jeanne (2001)].  Another radical 
approach calls for the formation of a global lender of last resort [see Soros (1998)], an 
approach that would institutionalized a global type of the FDIC arrangement.  All these 
proposals share the concern of minimizing ex-post bailouts that were not pre-approved at 
the lending stage.  
A less aggressive approach to provide greater stability is the imposition of reserve 
requirements on lenders and/or borrowers, as well as the possibility of capital adequacy 
requirements that are linked to the bank’s portfolio risk.  The Basle committee [as well as 
Chairman Alan Greenspan (1998)] advocates this approach. The rationale for the reserve 
requirements is provided by the presence of various externalities.  On the lender’s side, 
the anticipation of bailouts is introducing an externality, where marginal lending impacts 
adversely the taxpayer.  On the borrower’s side, as long as partial defaults are costly, 
marginal borrowing affects all agents by increasing the probability of a costly default that 
would impact all [see Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002)].  Alternatively, emerging 
markets may enact similar policies aimed at curbing short-term financial flows, akin to 
the Chilean system in the nineties [see Eichengreen (1999)].
8   
A different tack of reforms has focused on the ex-post resolution of crises.  One 
approach advocates institutionalizing ex-ante the possibility of credit relief in bad times.  
This may be accomplished by attaching to all foreign currency liabilities the option 
entitling the borrowers to extend the debt for a specified period, at a mandatory penalty 
rate [see Buiter and Sibert (1999)].  In order to facilitate the coordination among large 
numbers of diffused lenders, various proposals advocate deeper institutional changes.  
                                                 
8 See De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdes (2000) for a mixed review of Chile’s experience 
with controls on inflows.  Edwards (2001) conclude that these controls “were successful 
in changing the maturity profile of capital inflows, and of the country’s foreign debt. 
Also, the controls allowed the monetary authority to have greater control over monetary 
policy.  This effect, however, appears to have been confined to the short run, and was not 
very important quantitatively.”  In evaluating Chile’s experience, one should keep in 
mind that Chile has been the best performing country in Latin America in recent years.  
Hence, Chile’s experience may provide limited inference about the potential benefits of 
controls on inflows to countries with more fragile financial systems.   10
The adoption of a modified version of domestic bankruptcy procedure has been 
frequently advocated [see Sachs (1995), Miller and Zhang (2000) and Kreuger (2001)].  
Specifically, such an “international workout mechanism” would aim at minimizing the 
cost of protracted negotiations.  It would allow the debtor the continuation of export and 
production with minimal disturbances.  It would also serve to coordinate among the 
diffused creditors, allowing smoother and faster resolution of the stand off between the 
involved parties.     11
  
3.  Reforming the financial system: the challenges 
  The growing list of proposed reforms is indicative of the emerging consensus that 
the present financial architecture needs a major overhaul.  While it is easy to point out the 
flaws of the existing system, any fundamental reform will confront a host of challenges.  
We review briefly some of the general issues involved, and illustrate their relevance in 
understanding the limitations of various proposals.  
 
The Lucas critic; Political economy and coordination failure  
  Any significant reform will change agents’ behavior in ways that are hard to 
predict without understanding the fundamental forces explaining sovereign borrowing 
and default.  Some of the relevant fundamentals are determined by the political economy 
characterization of emerging markets, and by the challenges confronting attempts to deal 
with coordination failures.  Short of a fuller understanding of the fundamental forces 
leading to exposure and crises, suggested reforms may lead to disappointing results at 
best, and welfare reduction at worst.  We illustrate these considerations by analyzing the 
potential pitfalls in several proposed reforms. 
 
 
3.1   Debt maturity structure 
  Jeanne (2001) illustrates the importance of understanding the forces leading to 
vulnerability as a necessary condition for evaluating the welfare effects of changing the 
international financial architecture. Specifically, he focused on understanding the 
maturity structure of countries' external liabilities as the solution to an incentives 
problem.  He considered a country attempting to borrow when there is uncertainty about 
its solvency due to exogenous shocks. The country can enhance its solvency by 
implementing a costly fiscal adjustment, and it can borrow on a short term or a long-term 
basis.  This situation imposes a trade off -- when government's solvency deteriorates; 
short-term debt becomes less expensive or more accessible than long-term debt.  This 
comes with a cost: the government is under more pressure to restore the fiscal situation if 
its debt has a shorter maturity, because it is more vulnerable to a crisis in which creditors   12
do not roll over their claims. This is due to the observation that short-term debt opens the 
door to self-fulfilling crises, in which creditors stop rolling over their loans for an 
extraneous reason unrelated to the fundamentals. There is a tension, thus, between the 
disciplinary benefits of short-term debt and the risk of unwarranted rollover crises. 
  In this context, Jeanne investigates the welfare effect of institutions that facilitate 
an orderly workout of debt crises, (e.g., an international bankruptcy court and officially 
sanctioned standstills); and of international lender of last resort. These measures are 
shown to improve welfare, but to fall short of the first-best.  The first best in Jeanne’s 
model is achieved by a “crisis insurance fund" which ex-post bails out countries 
conditional on the ex-ante fiscal adjustment, and payment a risk premium. 
   
3.2  Transparency and the feasibility of “Crisis insurance fund” conditional on ex-ante 
adjustment effort. 
It is non-controversial that a minimum level of transparency of financial positions 
and policies is a necessary condition for financial markets to exist and to operate.
9  Yet, 
it’s not clear that greater transparency would eliminate the exposure to crises.  Setting 
standards for transparency may encourage creative accounting, where each crisis exposes 
new loopholes, inducing a change in the required rules of the game.  While “transparency 
creep” is unavoidable, putting too much faith in the importance of transparency may lead 
some investors to a false sense of security.  Indeed, full information does not negate the 
possibility of crises induced by multiple equilibria. 
One of the innovative proposals dealing with reforming the IMF is to insure 
countries against financial crises only if they met ex-ante criteria [see Jeanne (2001) and 
Meltzer (1998)].  A necessary condition for such a scheme is transparency.  In practice, 
however, verification is costly and fuzzy.  Frequently, it takes a major crisis to force the 
“real books” to open [see the case of Korean’s reserves in the 1997 crisis, and the recent 
Enron fiasco].  These practical considerations suggest that only in the aftermath of a 
crisis we learn the degree to which the ex-ante criteria were met, as a crisis may reveal 
                                                 
9 For example, greater uncertainty about the net indebtness of a country would lead to 
thinner markets, and may eventually lead to the collapse of voluntary lending [see Kletzer 
(1984), Calvo (1999) and Aizenman and Marion (1999)].   13
that some of these criteria were met only superficially.  It may be hard to verify ex-ante if 
the institutional environment changed enough to warrant the insurance.  Hence, costly 
monitoring and the impossibility to verify fully the depth of the adjustment limit the 
applicability of this proposal.  In these circumstances, we are left with no clean solutions, 
and there may be no escape from the need to “muddle through” protracted negotiations in 
the aftermath of crises. 
 
3.3  The use (and abuse) of International Reserves, and vulnerability indicators 
  A high short-term debt/International reserves ratio was found to be a vulnerability 
indicator, signifying of exposure to crises [see Rodrik and Velasco (1999)].  Does it 
imply that emerging markets would benefit by increasing the cushion of international 
reserves, signaling thereby they’re being a safer borrower?  Countries like Chile, Korea, 
and Taiwan have managed large stocks of international reserves.  Does it follow that 
other countries will benefit from hording more international reserves in order to reduce 
the above vulnerability index? As the Lucas Critic would suggest, a deeper understanding 
of the economy is needed in order to answer this question.  
This point can be illustrated in a model of emerging markets, where there is a 
conflict between efficiency and political economy considerations.  Specifically, countries 
characterized by sovereign risk, tax collection costs, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, 
and a volatile GDP opt to engage in large external borrowing.  Suppose that international 
reserves are beyond creditors’ control [this would be the case if the location and the 
magnitude of the reserves is not public information, implying also that the partial default 
repayment is independent of the stock of reserves].  In the absence of political economy 
considerations, higher borrowing can be shown to be accompanied with a greater 
accumulation of international reserves [see Aizenman and Marion (2002)]. While this 
adjustment is welfare enhancing, it may do little to prevent a sovereign debt crisis.  
Suppose now that there is political uncertainty regarding the identity of the future 
administration -- there is a positive probability that an opportunistic administration will 
“loot” the treasury, channeling resources towards narrow interest groups.  Greater 
political instability can be shown to reduce the demand for international reserves, and to   14
increase borrowing.
10  Hence, the association between external borrowing and 
international reserves depends critically on political economy factors.  High short-term 
debt/reserve ratio may be the symptom of political instability.  In these circumstances, a 
policy that will target a drop in the short-term debt/international reserves ratio without 
dealing with the political economy considerations that determine the prospect of future 
looting, is welfare reducing.  Such a policy does not necessarily reduce vulnerability to 
crisis, and in fact it may increase the probability of a crisis. 
Similar concerns may apply to the usefulness of vulnerability indicators.  These 
indicators provide information on variables correlated with past crises.  Attempts to 
encourage the dissemination and the use of these indicators in allocating global funds 
may have mixed results. One doubts the degree to which these indicators will perform in 
the future, out of the sample used to construct them. One may also envision situations in 
which the introduction of quasi-official indicators provide a false sense of security; where 
market participants may attach too much value to these indicators, ignoring other relevant 
information. It may induce emerging markets to ‘distort’ the indicators in order to signal 
their relative soundness.  As the previous discussion illustrated, short of deeper reforms, 
these signals may be misleading, and may not indicate a genuine reduction in 





                                                 
10   If the present administration is opportunistic, it will “loot” all liquid resources, 
hence it will minimize its reserves holdings, and maximize borrowing.  If the present 
administration is benevolent, a higher probability of a future opportunistic administration 
will reduce the present demand for international reserves, and will increase borrowing, as 
a way of reducing the resources available for future looting.     15
3.4  Time inconsistency and political economy considerations – how important is the 
choice of exchange rate regimes? 
 
  Crises are frequently the delayed manifestations of political economy factors.  
Reforms that ignore these factors run the risk of inducing too optimistic an assessment of 
countries, leading overtime to a large exposure, and ultimately to greater vulnerability.  
The literature on the optimal exchange rate regimes frequently attaches too much 
importance to the choice of monetary policy.  Beyond the short-run, monetary and fiscal 
policies are intertwined via the intertemporal budget constraints.  Indeed, one may argue 
that a deficient fiscal system may lead to crises independently of the exchange rate 
regimes.  In these circumstances, the choice of the exchange rate regime will impact only 
on the timing of the ultimate crisis.  After all, sovereign risk and exchange rate risks have 
different causes.  Casting the problem in terms of the “smart” choice of an exchange rate 
regime is potentially hazardous, as it obscures the need to challenge the deeper fiscal 
deficiencies.   
These considerations are illustrated in the contrast of the policies undertaken by 
Brazil and Argentina in the last 15 years.  In the eighties, both countries were 
characterized by similar fiscal deficiencies, stemming from their organization as a loose 
federal system, where the provincial states and municipalities had a significant bargaining 
power relative to the federal center.  In the early nineties, both countries went through 
successful exchange rate based stabilizations.  The nominal anchor provided by pegging 
the exchange rate, supported rapid disinflation in both countries.  Argentina, however, put 
a much greater emphasis on the importance of a peg – it adopted a rigid currency board.  
In contrast, Brazil put greater emphasis on dealing with its fiscal imbalances, reducing 
thereby the relative power of the provincial states.
 11  In addition, Brazil moved overtime 
from a fixed exchange rate regime towards discretionary exchange rate management, 
accommodating external adverse shocks with occasional depreciations.  As the recent 
events have painfully illustrated, Brazil’s choice allowed it to steer away from a deep 
                                                 
11 While it’s premature to conclude that Brazil has accomplished all the adjustments 
called for under the Fiscal Responsibility act of 2001, it started the painful process of 
curbing the biases towards provincial overspending.  See Dillinger and Webb (1999) for 
further details about the reforms.   16
crisis, whereas Argentina’s choice has lead overtime to increased vulnerability, and to the 
ultimate recent crisis.   
 
3.5  Mulitiple equilibria and the international lender of last resort 
One possible justification for “bailing out” countries is the presence of multiple 
equilibria.  Exposure to multiple equilibria is a by-product of the maturity transformation 
accomplish by financial intermediation, where short term deposits are used to finance 
longer term real project [see Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for a banking model, and 
Chang and Velasco (1999) for an open economy model of bank and currency runs].  In 
these circumstances, the presence of the lender of last resort is supposed to prevent the 
bad equilibrium. As Rogoff (1999) discussed, lenders of last resorts comes with a hefty 
cost to the taxpayer.  Some may view the fate of Argentina as an example of a country 
suffering from the adverse consequences of a switch to a bad equilibrium.  Supporters of 
this view point out that conventional measures (current account, fiscal deficits, etc.) 
failed to flag out Argentina as a highly vulnerable country in the 1990’s.  Indeed, 
Argentina’s fiscal measures were comparable to those of ‘respected’ OECD countries.   
Can we infer from this that a lender of last resort would have prevented the Argentinean 
crisis? 
While it’s hard to test this assertion, there are fundamental challenges facing the 
multiple equilibria argument.  Vulnerability to a crisis may depend on the flexibility of an 
economy to adjust to changing circumstances.  This includes the ability of the fiscal 
system and the labor market to adjust to unforeseen events.  More generally, country risk 
may be determined by the interaction between shocks, and the quality of the institutions 
of conflict management [see Rodrik (1999)].  In the context of Argentina, the multiple 
equilibria interpretation is challenged by the view that Argentina is a quasi European 
Style welfare state, standing on the shoulders of a very thin tax base.  This situation is 
further exacerbated by a provincial states’ bias towards overspending.  Hence, one may 
conclude that there are fundamental reasons to view Argentina as a risky destination for 
global capital; even if its fiscal deficits and current account deficits are comparable to 
OECD countries.    17
The insistence of the Argentinean authorities on preserving the currency board 
despite the growing strength of the dollar and the occasional real depreciations of Brazil 
may be viewed as a manifestation of these risks --viewing the currency board as the main 
safeguard against inflation runs the hazard of providing a signal that the deeper fiscal 
problems are still there.   Placing too much faith on the currency board as the mechanism 
for fiscal discipline overlooks the fact that the cost of changing the exchange rate regime 
(and more generally of monetary policy) is much lower than the cost of a fundamental 
fiscal reform.  Hence, a country like Argentina runs the risk of being viewed as fiscally 
unstable, independently of the realized path of current account and fiscal deficits.  In the 
long run, according to this view, the fiscal side will determine the strength of the system.  
Short of resolving fiscal deficiencies, a country like Argentina will find it hard to 
convince the market that it’s a prudent destination for capital. 
One may rephrase the above discussion in terms of the rules versus discretion 
literature, where there are gains from delegating monetary policy to a conservative agent.  
As was illustrated in Rogoff’s (1985) seminal work, the optimal commitment to the 
conservative course depends on the stochastic structure.  If the balance of shocks tilts 
overtime towards adverse real shocks, a less conservative course is preferable.  The 
success of Brazil and the failure of Argentina may be viewed as a vivid example of this 
principle.  The success of the structural reform would require also challenging the fiscal 
deficiencies that determine, in the long run, the course on monetary policy.  Hence, the 
relative success of Brazil is attributed to its success in curbing the bias towards provincial 
overspending, and in a more appropriate use of discretionary exchange rate and monetary 
policy. 
 
3.6  Policies designed to impose discipline on the market - reserve and capital 
adequacy requirements 
The introduction of reserve requirements by either borrowers or lenders may 
impose better discipline on the global financial market.  Borrowing will decline, and so 
will default risk, reducing the necessity for continuing bailouts.  The introduction of 
reserve requirements will improve welfare in both the lending and borrowing economies. 
In these circumstances, the lender's optimal reserve requirement increases with the   18
expected bailout [see Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002)].  Indirectly, this policy may 
reduce the bias in favor of debt and against equity in international lending, identified by 
Rogoff (1999).  But the design of the optimal reserve requirement in a decentralized 
world is a delicate matter, and both the optimal lender's reserve requirement and the 
optimal borrower's requirement have both attractive and unattractive features.  Indeed, 
without a proper coordination among all lenders, the reserve requirements will reallocate 
lending from high to low reserve countries, with few beneficial effects.  Hence, the gains 
of such policies will be determined by the ability of international institutions [the BIS, 
IMF, etc.] to induce all lenders to apply similar policies, driven by the underlying risk 
factors. 
 
   19
4. Concluding  remarks 
 
The global financial market has been shaken throughout the nineties by a series of 
major financial crises.  Attempts to stabilize the global system have led to large bailouts. 
This experience suggests that the present system cannot survive indefinitely, as the 
willingness of taxpayers in the OECD countries to engage in continuing bailouts is 
approaching its limits.  The presumption is that we deal with a second-best situation, in 
which there is no quick fix but welfare can be enhanced by the proper regulatory changes.  
While prudent borrowing of emerging market economics is beneficial, excessive 
borrowing may be disadvantageous due to existing distortions.  In such an environment, 
one should either reduce the existing distortions, or induce borrowers and lenders to 
internalize them. 
Recent proposals for the “New International Financial Architecture” have focused 
on reform along two margins; reducing the ex-ante probability of a crisis, and inducing 
more orderly resolution of a crisis.  In evaluating the various of proposals, it is important 
to stress that there are good reasons to support both more effective crisis management and 
more prudent ex-ante allocation of credit.  As each deals with a different margin, they 
should complement each other.  Specifically, the crisis management proposals do not 
address directly the excessive risk undertaken due to moral hazard, as the ex-post 
“solvency” of some of the resultant projects hinge on bailouts. Similarly, improving the 
prudential regulations would not eliminate liquidity crises.  Hence the need for more 
efficient crisis management and resolution remains a high priority issue.   This is 
especially due to the growing diversity of lenders, implying that the task of coordinating 
the resolution of crises is more involved.   
Greater global integration increased the responsiveness of financial flows to news.  
This development is potentially beneficial in good times, but it has adverse consequences 
when things go wrong.  Hence, the darker side of globalization is that financial crises 
increase the scope for conflicts -- the direct stakes are higher.  Once the bad news hits the 
market, the key issue is not only the ultimate distribution of the burden of adjustment 
between the debtors and creditors, but also the length of time it would take to settle down 
the dispute.  The killer of future cooperation may be the uncertainty regarding the dispute 
resolution mechanism, as it exposes creditors to the hazards of long haggling over a   20
shrinking pie.  Protracted negotiations will prolong the period where both domestic and 
international agents refrain from new investments.  This in turn will deepen the recession 
in the affected countries, increasing the social tension, further increasing losses.  The net 
outcome may be greater temptation for the domestic authorities to embark on populist 
policies, leading towards autarky, a trend that will hurt further prospects of trade 
integration.  Hence, the recent crises may be viewed as a test case for the efficiency of the 
global dispute resolution mechanism.  While one hopes that the direct financial contagion 
from Argentina to other countries will be limited, one expects that a slow and protracted 
resolution of the crisis will highlight the inability of the present system to deal efficiently 
with adverse shocks, thereby reducing future financial flows, and putting in jeopardy 
other vulnerable countries.   
The urgency of these issues is illustrated by the willingness of top IMF executives 
to engage constructively in a debate concerning the future form of the global dispute 
resolution mechanism [see Krueger (2001)].   One expects that only reforms that offer 
practical solutions will pass the market test and will endure the political process needed 
to implement them.  One doubts the degree to which “clean” ideas, like insurance based 
only on meeting ex-ante conditionality, will survive the time inconsistency and the 
transparency challenges.  Considering the greater weight of non-bank lending, and the 
great increase in the number of institutional investors, one expects reforms dealing with 
better coordination among creditors, and with the formation of international bankruptcy 
procedures, to be vigorously tested by looming crises.     21
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The Welfare effect  
of financial opening 
Explanation 
 
Potentially large  
benefits.  
Financial opening may lead to large benefits, stemming from better risk pooling, 
information collection and maturity transformation, providing thereby deeper liquidity 
[Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Obstfeld (1994), Acemoglu  and Zilibotti (1998)]. 
 
Positive but small  
benefits from  
financial opening. 
Second order magnitude gains from international diversification of output risk [Cole and  
Obstfeld (1991)]. 
Ambiguous welfare  
effects. 
 
- If production does involve learning by doing, opening capital  
markets does not necessarily improve welfare for the nation or for the world 
as a whole [Kohn and Marion (1991)]. 
- Overborrowing due to moral hazard and euphoric expectations, leading to crises  
[McKinnon and Pill (1996); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999)]. 
- Overborrowing due to congestion externalities, where atomistic agents do not internalize 
the full effects of marginal borrowing on future welfare [Aizenman (1989)]; 
Overborrowing due to free rider problems in economies short of international collateral, 
generated by imperfections of the domestic capital market [Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2001)]. 
- Emerging markets are more prone to financial crashes.  This will be the case when financial
market capitalization depends on the expectations of agents regarding aggregate investment 
in their economy.  This gives rise to potential coordination failures, which may be  
exacerbated for low income countries by financial globalization [Martin and Rey (2001)]. 
 
 
      
Table 1 
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Ex ante steps 





The IMF would provide unconditional short-term credit only to countries that are 
pre-approved [ex-ante conditionality].  The credit is at penalty rate.  Recommend 
to restrain the IMF’s ability to allocate credit using ex-post conditionality, and to 











The adjustment of the minimum capital standards to the risk exposure of banks, 
including an adjustment for sovereign risk.  This is done in order to mitigate 







Argues for Chilean-style capital-inflow taxes as the only effective solution to the 
dangers of an open capital account when risk management is inadequate, 















Adopting international bankruptcy-style procedures akin to those applied to 
corporate debt.  The proposed procedure provides better coordination among 
competing creditors, as well as a short-run relief to the debtor from the induced 
credit crunch, enabling the continuation of export and production.  This would be 
done as part of a controlled restructuring, and may include issuing new senior 
debt.  
The addition of collective action clauses to loan agreements and the 
establishment of standing bondholders committees are needed for a market-based 
solution to be feasible.  
International workout mechanism: a framework offering a debtor country legal 
protection from creditors that stand in the way of a necessary restructuring, in 
exchange for an obligation of the debtor to negotiate with its creditors in good 
faith and to put in place policies that would prevent a similar problem from 






Attaching to all foreign currency liabilities the option entitling the borrowers to 









Insurance by a global authority, akin to a global FDIC.  Borrowers would pay the 
premium.  International monitors (like the IMF or the BIS) would set borrowing 
ceilings, and no bailouts would be enforced on non-insured loans. 
 
“Crisis insurance fund” which bails out countries conditional on the payment of 















Shifting financing from debt to equity.  This would be facilitated by mitigating 
the factors contributing to the bias towards debt [like a deposit insurance which 




A warning system for crises, taking into account a broad variety of indicators. 
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